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I. Introduction

Because the preceding edition of this publication did not
contain an article on trends in commercial transactions or
consumer protection in California, this article will discuss
selected decisions and developments in those fields during the
years 1968 and 1969. 1 The principal focus of this article
will be the significant decisions made during this period that interpret or relate to the principal statutes in the two fields: the
California Commercial Code, 2 the Rees-Levering Automobile
Sales Finance Act, and the Unruh Retail Installment Sales
Act. These legislative enactments establish a comprehensive
statutory pattern for regulation of all aspects of commercial
law in this state.
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1. Due to publication deadlines, no
decisions subsequent to October 1,
1969, are included within the scope of
this article. It should also be noted
that the article's scope does not include a discussion of federal statutes
that affect commercial activity within
this state. Thus, the Truth-In-Lending
Act (Public Law 90-321, 82 Stat. 146,
15 U.S.C.A. 1601 et seq.) and its significance is omitted from discussion. The
interested reader is referred to the already voluminous literature on this subject, including: Butler, Truth and Confusion in Lending, 55 American Bar
Assn. Journal 27 (Jan., 1969); Barrett,
An Introduction to Truth in Lending,
14 Practical Lawyer 83 (Dec., 1968);
and Attorney's Guide to Truth in Lending, California Continuing Education of
the Bar (1969).
Also beyond the scope of this article are the substantial number of California decisions concerning real property transactions and secured interest
in real estate, including Connor v.
Great Western Saving & Loan Association, 69 Cal.2d 850, 73 Cal. Rptr. 369
(1968) and Hellbaum v. Lytton Savings & Loan Association, 274 Cal. App.
2d - , 79 Cal. Rptr. 9 (June, 1969).
444

2. The Uniform Commercial Code,
commonly known as the V.C.C., was
enacted with numerous amendments in
1963 by the California legislature, and
became effective on January 1, 1965.
The California version of the U.e.C. is
commonly known, and will be referred
to in this article, as the California Commercial Code or Cal. Com. Code. The
official text of the V.C.e. was accompanied by the comments of its drafters,
and the California Commercial Code is
similarly interpreted with the aid of
the California Code Comments. Hereafter, references to the two commentaries will be made as V.C.C. Comment to
(e.g.) section 3419, or Cal. Code Comment to (e.g.) section 415. The two
sets of Comments can be found in Deering's Annotated Commercial Code immediately following the section to
which they relate.
For a reason unknown to the author,
the California legislature, in enacting
the California Commercial Code, chose
to label the nine major sections of the
code as Divisions, whereas the V.e.C.
labels the same nine major sections as
"Articles." Thus Division 2 of the
California Commercial Code is the enactment, with some amendments, of
Article 2 of the U.e.e.
CAL LAW 1970
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The amendatory activity of the state legislature, which was
a principal subject of Professor Levy's article on Commercial
Transactions in the 1967 edition of this publication,3 virtually ceased in the years 1968 and 1969 with regard to the
California Commercial Code. However, as will be hereafter
noted, the California legislature has been quite active in regard to the Rees-Levering and Unruh Acts. In general, the
case law development regarding these three statutes has been
beneficial during the years in question, and a number of difficult decisions, particularly in the field of negotiable instruments, have been determined by the Courts of Appeal. The
primary contribution of the California Supreme Court during
this period was a single decision, the importance of which can
hardly be overstated. This article concludes with an extended
discussion of that decision, Morgan v. Reasor/ and the opinion rendered therein by Justice Tobriner.
II. California Commercial Code
A. Liabilities of Banks in Paying or "Cashing" Checks
The attention of the courts of this state was often directed,
during 1968 and 1969, to the subject of the liability of banks
in dealing with their customers and persons to whom their customers have issued checks. While the California Commercial
Code contains various sections that deal with this subject, 6
the cases under discussion here presented fact situations that
are not resolved by the explicit terms of the code. As used
in this discussion, the term "drawee bank" refers to the bank
on which the check in question has been drawn,6 and the term
"collecting bank" refers to any bank other than the drawee
bank that has handled the check. 7 Usually, the collecting
bank is the first bank to which a check is transferred in the
collection process; in layman's terms, the bank in which the
3. See Levy, COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS, Cal Law-Trends and Developments 1967, pp. 47, 76.
4. 69 Cal.2d 881, 73 Cal. Rptr. 398,
447 P.2d 638 (1968).
CAL LAW 1970
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5. See divisions 3 and 4 of the Cal.
Com. Code.
6. See Cal. Com. Code § 4105(b) and
U.C.c. Comment 2 to that section.
7. Cal. Com. Code § 4105(d).
445
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check is "cashed." In the sense that the word is used both
in this article and in the code, only the drawee bank can "pay"
a check, since it is the only bank that is ordered to make such
a "payment" by the terms of the check. s
In Indiana Plumbing Supply Company v. Bank of America,9
the Court determined that a joint payee on a check whose
indorsement is forged by a fellow joint payee in cashing the
check has a cause of action against the collecting bank to recover the amount of the check.lO The Court adopted the reasoning and resolution of the issue previously announced in
Harry H. White Lumber Co. v. Crocker Citizens National
Bank. ll Both decisions declare that the precode California
case law permitted such a recovery, and that the code contains
no indication that the prior California rule is altered in any
way.12 Courts in other jurisdictions have also reached the
related conclusion that nothing contained in the Uniform
Commercial Code controls on the liability of a collecting bank
that has cashed a check on a forged indorsement to the drawer
of the check. 13 It is worth noting in this context that at least
some commentators feel that the code did effect a change in
the prior California law in giving the payee a direct right of
action against the drawee bank that pays a check on a forged
indorse men t.14
Another major question relating to a collecting bank's liability when it cashes a check on a forged indorsement is unresolved by the code. The question is whether the drawer
of the check can assert a direct cause of action against the collecting bank that cashed the check on the basis of the forged
indorsement. By way of background, it is clear that the payee
8. While the word "pay" is not defined in the code, this is the obvious
meaning given to the word by the statute. See Cal. Com. Code §§ 3401(1)
(b), 3104 (2)(a), (b).
9. 255 Cal. App.2d 910, 63 Cal.
Rptr. 658 (1967).
10. 255 Cal. App.2d 910, 915, 63
Cal. Rptr. 658, 660-661 (1967).
11. 253 Cal. App.2d 368, 61 Cal.
Rptr. 381 (1967).

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1970/iss1/15
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12. 255 Cal. App.2d 910, 915, 63
Cal. Rptr. 658, 660-661, and 253 Cal.
App.2d 368, 376, 61 Cal. Rptr. 381,
386 (1967).
13. Stone & Webster Engineering
Corp. v. First National Bank & Trust
Company, 345 Mass. 1, 184 N.E.2d
358, 361, 99 A.L.R.2d 628 (1962).
14. See California Code Comment 3
to Cal. Com. Code § 3419.
CAL LAW 1970
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of the forged check may sue either the drawee bank or the collecting bank.ls It is also clear that the drawee bank cannot
charge the drawer's account after paying the forged check. 16
If the drawee bank cannot charge the drawer's account, it
would appear to be saddled with the loss. However, in such
a situation, the code established the right of the drawee bank
to recover the amount of the check from the collecting bank
on the theory that the collecting bank has breached its warranty of the validity of all indorsements necessary to give it
"good title. 1ll7
None of the liabilities and rights of action mentioned in the
preceding paragraph, considered individually, resolves the issue of the drawer's right of action against the collecting bank.
Further complicating the matter is the fact that the drawee
bank's liability to the drawer for paying a check on a forged
indorsement is subject to a time limitation. The drawer must
examine his checks and report the forgery to the drawee bank
within 1 year from the time he receives the bank statement
and canceled check. Failure on the drawer's part to report the
forgery within 1 year bars him, pursuant to section 4406 ( 4 )
of the code, from suing the bank.ls The public policy in favor
of prompt examination of bank statements and canceled
checks to discover forgeries supports the imposition of the
section 4406( 4) requirements. 19
It is obvious that permitting a drawer to sue the collecting
bank directly avoids circuity of actions, a wholly worthwhile
goaPO However, a drawer, barred by the limitations period
15. See Cal. Com. Code § 3419(1)(c)
in regard to the drawee bank's liability
in such a situation, and the discussion
of Indiana Plumbing Supply Co. v.
Bank of America, supra, concerning the
collecting bank's liability.
16. See discussion of Wright v. Bank
of California, infra.
17. See Cal. Com. Code § 4207(1)(a).
18. See Cal. Com. Code § 4406(4).
The official text of the V.C.C., on the
other hand, would allow the drawer to
CAL LAW 1970
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report the forgery to the drawee bank
within a 3-year period.
19. See V.C.c. Comment 7 to Cal.
Com. Code § 4406.
20. Two recent cases demonstrate
the salutary effect of the statutory
codification of the law regarding the
banking process in division 4 of the
California Commercial Code. By relying on the well-drawn definitions of
such terms as "collecting bank" and
"documentary draft," two recent California decisions resolve difficult and
447
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established in section 4406 ( 4) from an action against the
drawee bank, might be able to circumvent the statutory policy
encompassed in this section if he is entitled to sue the collecting bank. A concern for this aspect of the problem led the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts to deny the drawer
a right of recovery based on a conversion theory against the
collecting bank in Stone & Webster Engineering Corp. v. First
National Bank & Trust Company.l
In July, 1969, the Court of Appeal rendered the first decision in this state subsequent to the passage of the California
Commercial Code on the liability question. 2 In Allied Concord Financial Corporation v. Bank of America,3 the Court,
concluding that the enactment of the code provided an opportunity to consider the liability issue on a new basis, held that
the drawer was entitled, on third-party beneficiary principles,
to the benefit of the warranties of proper indorsement that the
collecting bank makes by implication to the drawee bank. 4
complex fact situations in a clearly correct manner. (See Frontier Refining
Co. v. Home Bank, 272 Cal. App.2d
630, 77 Cal. Rptr. 641 (1969), which
applied the definition of "collecting
bank" at Cal. Com. Code § 4105(d),
and Valenzuela v. Bank of America,
272 Cal. App.2d 673, 77 Cal. Rptr.
609 (1969), in which the Court applied
the definition of "documentary draft"
as defined in Cal. Com. Code § 4104(f),
in decisions exonerating the banks involved from liability.) At least on the
evidence of these two decisions, the optimistic belief of the drafters of Article
4 of the U.C.C. that a codification of
the rules regulating this complex and
often arcane area would greatly benefit
the banking industry, the commercial
bar, and the courts, seems justified.
(See U.C.C. Comment to Cal. Com.
Code § 4101. Article 4 of the U.c.e.
was, of course, enacted, with some
amendments to conform with existing
California banking practice, as Division
4 of the Cal. Com. Code.) Article 4
was designed by its drafters to replace

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1970/iss1/15
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the American Bankers Association Bank
Collection Code, several "deferred posting" statutes, and decisional law in the
various states. (See U.C.C. Comment
to Cal. Com. Code § 4101.) In California, the adoption of article 4 replaced Financial Code sections 10101019. These former sections of the
Financial Code constituted one of the
few comprehensive state bank collection statutes. (See Introductory Comment to division 4 of the Cal. Com.
Code.)
1. 345 Mass. 1, 184 N.E.2d 358,
361, 99 A.L.R.2d 628 (1962).
2. The precode rule in California had
been that the drawer had no right of
action against the collecting bank. See
California Mill Supply Corp. v. Bank
of America, 36 Ca1.2d 334, 223 P.2d
849 (1950); Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. San Francisco Bank, 58
Cal. App.2d 528, 136 P.2d 853 (1943).
3. 275 Cal. App.2d - , 80 Cal. Rptr.
622 (1969).
4. See 275 Cal. App.2d - , - , 80
Cal. Rptr. 622, 624.
CAL LAW 1970
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The decision, for support, notes that the West Virginia Supreme Court recently resolved the same issue in a similar
fashion. 5
On the issue that had troubled the Massachusetts Court in
Stone & Webster, supra, the Court of Appeal resolved the
question by imposing the I-year statute of limitations contained in section 4406 ( 4) on any action that the drawer might
bring against the collecting bank relating to a forged indorsement. 6 Thus, the Court gives the collecting bank the advantages of all the defenses available to the drawee bank in an
action by a drawer whose account is charged for a check paid
on a forged indorsement. The Court concludes its decision
by rejecting the claim of the drawer to a right of action against
the collecting bank based on a conversion theory.7 The Allied
Concord decision is clearly correct and constitutes a valuable
addition to the body of decisions interpreting the Uniform
Commercial Code.
A related issue came to the attention of the Court in Blackmon v. Hale. s In that case, the drawer of a check sought
recovery from the drawee bank for paying a check on which
"Adams & Hale Trust Account" was the payee. The check
was indorsed "Adams and Hale Trust Account, by J. C.
Adams" and "Adams, Hale and Lee Trust Account.,,9 The
drawer claimed that the check had not been effectively indorsed and that his bank was therefore liable for charging it
against his account. The Court of Appeal held that the check
had been validly indorsed because it had the Adams, Hale and
Lee Trust Account indorsement. Io
5. Citing Commercial Credit Corp.
v. Citizens National Bank, 144 SE2d
784, 788-790, 150 W. Va. 196 (1965).
6. See 275 Cal. App.2d - , - , 80
Cal. Rptr. 622, 624-625 (1969).
7. 275 Cal. App.2d"-, 80 Cal. Rptr.
622, 625-627 (1969).
8. 273 A.C.A. 780, 78 Cal. Rptr. 569,
hearing granted July 30, 1969. After
this article had been completed, the California Supreme Court handed down a
CAL LAW 1970
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decision in the case, 1 C.3d 548, 83 Cal.
Rptr. 194, 463 P.2d 418.
9. J. C. Adams was an attorney
whose law firm originally maintained
the "Adams & Hale Trust Account."
The firm added Lee and changed its
trust account designation to "Adams,
Hale and Lee Trust Account." See 273
Cal. App.2d - , 78 Cal. Rptr. 572.
572.
10. 273 Cal. App.2d - , 78 Cal.
Rptr. at 573.
449
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The trial court had concluded that the check was "bearer
paper," since it was payable to an account and not to an individual, and thus needed no indorsement for negotiation.
The reviewing Court rejected this ground on the basis of the
rule expressed in California Commercial Code section 3110
(1) (e).l1 The Court went on to state that since Adams was
the "representative" of the trust account, his indorsement of
the check, which was "order paper," was an effective indorsement. Unfortunately, some question is raised as to the validity
of the decision on the basis of the facts stated therein, for
Adams was not authorized to make withdrawals from the
trust account on his own signature alone. The signature card
of the bank that held the trust account required either Hale's
signature by itself or Adams' and Lee's signature jointly for
proper withdrawals. Thus, perhaps Adams was not the "representative" of the Adams, Hale and Lee Trust Account for
purposes of section 3110 ( 1 ) ( e ) . However, there is no question that the Court's resolution of the "bearer paper" or "order
paper" issue is correct. 12
The only decision in this area during this period that appears on its face to be clearly in error was rendered in September, 1969, in the case of Wright v. Bank of California. 13 In
Wright, the plaintiff, as the result of misrepresentations by
Feinberg, his cojoint venturer, was induced to write a check
on the joint venture account in a substantial sum payable to
March Construction Co. After obtaining the check, Feinberg
gave it to a confederate who posed as a representative of
11. Cal. Com. Code § 3110 lists
those types of instruments that are
deemed to be "order paper" requiring
an indorsement for negotiation. Among
the types of order paper listed are those
instruments that ".
may be
payable to the order of . . . an
estate, trust or fund, in which case it
is payable to the order of the representative of such estate, trust or fund or
his successors . . . ." Although §
3110(l)(e) was not applicable to the
transaction before the Court, since the
effective date of the Cal. Com. Code

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1970/iss1/15
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was January 1, 1965, and the transaction occurred in 1961, the Court was
of the opinion that the rule expressed
therein was sound law and should be
followed.
12. The section was intended by the
U.C.C. drafters to change the law in
those states that considered checks
drawn payable to someone other than a
named individual as "bearer paper."
See U.C.C. Comment 2 to Cal. Com.
Code § 3110(2).
13. 276 Cal. App.2d - , 81 Cal.
Rptr. 11 (1969).
CAL LAW 1970
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March and took it to the drawee bank. The confederate
forged an application for a cashier's check payable to March,
gave the application and the unindorsed check to the drawee
bank, and received a cashier's check in the same sum as the
original check, payable to March. Through further efforts,
Feinberg and his confederate were able to cash the cashier's
check at a second bank. The drawee bank on the original
check charged the joint venture account for its amount, and
Wright sued to have the charge restored. He relied on a number of theories in his complaint, including negligence, conversion, and a common count for money had and received.
The trial court upheld the drawee bank's general demurrer
to the complaint and, although the Court of Appeal reversed
on other grounds, the appellate decision upheld that trial
court's determination that the drawee bank incurred no
liability for the mere act of "paying" the original check
without reqmnng any indorsement. I4
The reviewing
Court's reasoning was that whereas negotiation requires an
indorsement under California Commercial Code section 3202,
presentment of a check to a drawee bank for payment is an
act distinct from negotiation. I5 Thus, for effective payment,
there was no need for the drawee bank to obtain an indorsement of the instrument, and the bank therefore incurred no
liability when it charged the drawer's account.
This portion of the Court's opinion is clearly in error. If
nothing else, the internal inconsistencies in the decision
demonstrate this fact. In determining, in the second portion
of the opinion, that the bank may have been negligent in drawing the cashier's check without determining the identity or authority of the applicant, the Court noted that the "fictitious
payee" rule, which is, in essence, stated in California Commercial Code section 3405, is not applicable as a shield to the
drawee bank's possible liability for negligence. I6 The Court
14. The issuing of the cashier's check
by the drawee bank was clearly "payment" of the original check.
15. 276 Cal. App.2d - , - , 81 Cal.
Rptr. II, 13 (1969).
CAL LAW 1970
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16. Cal. Com. Code § 3405(1 )(b) and
(c) makes an indorsement by any person
in the name of a named payee "effective" if the drawer of the check, or the
employee of the drawer who supplied
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made the determination that section 3405 does not apply, on
the ground that there was no indorsement on the check. 17 The
Court might well have asked itself why the drawee bank would
have been protected, if, under section 3405, a forged indorsement would have been "effective." The reason is that without the fictitious payee doctrine, the bank could not legitimately charge the drawer's account, since it is basic negotiable
instruments law that a drawee bank that pays a check upon a
forged payee indorsement cannot charge the drawer's account. 18 This rule is based on the primary duty of a drawee
bank to pay the check as ordered by the drawer. If the drawee
bank pays the check to someone other than the actual payee,
or a subsequent legitimate "holder" of the check, the bank has
him with the name of the payee, intended the payee to have no interest
in the instrument. The "fictitious payee" rule applies to shift the burden of
loss in situations where a dishonest employee, with either the authority to
draw checks on his employer's account
or to make up such checks for the signature of a superior, causes the drawing
of a check payable to a person, fictitious
or not, whom the dishonest employee
never intends to receive the check. After the check is drawn, the dishonest employee takes the check to a bank, poses
as the named payee, forges the named
payee's signature, and converts the proceeds of the check to his own use.
Without the application of the fictitious payee rule, the bank would stand
the loss in such a situation. This is unfair since the employer, by hiring a dishonest employee, placed such an employee in a position to work his mischief. The fictitious payee doctrine,
as stated in the code, validates the
forged indorsement. Thus, the bank
is entitled to charge the employer's account, and the loss is shifted to the employer. (See Cal. Code Comment 2 to
Cal. Com. Code § 3405; Uniform Commercial Code Handbook, American
Bar Association, pp. 114-116) (1964

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1970/iss1/15
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Edition); The Uniform Commercial
Code, a Special Report by the California State Bar, 37 Journal of the
State Bar, PI>. 157-159 (1962), and,
generally, Abel, The Imposter Payee,
or Rhode Island was Right, 1940 Wis.
L. Rev. 161.

17. 276 Cal. App.2d - , - , 81 Cal.
Rptr. 11, 13-14 (1969).
18. See The Uniform Commercial
Code, a Special Report by the CalifonJia State Bar, 37 Journal of the
State Bar, pp. 155-156 (1962); Britton,
Bills and Notes, section 142 (1961);
Security First National Bank of Los
Angeles v. Bank of America, 22 Ca1.2d
154, 137 P.2d 452 (1943); Ryan v.
Bank of Italy, 106 Cal. App. 690, 289
P. 863 (1930). Although not clearly
stated in the code, all commentators
agree that this very basic rule has been
carried forward under the V.C.C.,
principally in the form of Cal. Com.
Code § 4401, which authorizes a bank
to charge a customer's account for
checks that are "properly' payable."
See 2 Smith, California Commercia I
Law, Continuing Education of the Bar,
section 8.22; Bunn et aI., An Introductioll to the Uniform Commercial Code
(1964 Ediiion), pp. 224-225.
CAL LAW 1970
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not made payment on the check in accordance with the "order" of the drawer. In Wright, a person posing as the payee
obtained payment of the check from the drawee bank. Obviously this does not accord with the order of the drawer of
the check, and the fact that the imposter did not forge the
payee's indorsement should be of no significance.
Since the decision in Wright v. Bank of California called for
a remand of the case to the trial court for further proceedings,
the decision, with its glaring error, may remain uncorrected
for some time until the California Supreme Court has an appropriate opportunity to disapprove or otherwise negate the
decision. 19
B. Liabilities of Signers of Negotiable Instruments
During the period under review, California courts rendered
two noteworthy decisions that may have future significance
concerning the liability of those who sign negotiable instruments. Twenty years ago, the California Supreme Court, in
Hamilton v. Abadjian20 announced that courts of this state will
not lend their process to the collection of gambling debts in
situations where the debt takes the form of checks cashed by
casinos to enable customers to gamble. Relying on the rule
expressed in Hamilton, the Court of Appeal in Lane & Pyron,
Inc. v. Gibbs l refused to affirm a judgment enforcing the liability of the drawer of a number of checks payable to Nevada
gambling casinos on the ground that the trial court record
contained no substantial evidence showing that the proceeds
of the checks were not used by the drawer in gambling activities at the casinos. The collector-assignee of the checks
had argued that because the casinos cashed the checks with no
limitation on where the proceeds could be spent, and because
the casinos offered a number of goods and services other than
gambling opportunities, the Hamilton rule should not apply.
The Court of Appeal disagreed and applied the Hamilton
19. A petition for rehearing was
filed in the case on October 14, 1969,
and denied by the Court of Appeal on
October 23, 1969.
CAL LAW 1970

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1970

20. 30 Cal. 2d 49, 179 P.2d 804
(1947).
1. 266 Cal. App.2d 61, 71 Cal. Rptr.
817 (1968).
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precedent. Although the plaintiff in Lane & Pyron, Inc. was
not a holder in due course, being merely an assignee for collection, the decision can be fairly read to imply that the results would be the same even if the plaintiff had been a goodfaith purchaser of the checks without notice of the circumstances of their original issue or transfer. Holders in due
course of negotiable instruments can enforce them against
drawers or makers without the necessity of meeting so-called
"personal" defenses such as failure of consideration, nonperformance of a condition precedent, etc. 2 However, holders
in due course do take instruments subject to those "real" defenses listed in California Commercial Code sections 3305
(2) (a) through (e). Among the "real" defenses listed is
"
illegality of the transaction, as renders the obligation
of the party [meaning the maker or drawer] a nullity.
."3 The judicial attitude reflected in Lane &
Pyron, Inc., will, it can be assumed, result in future decisions
holding that a check transaction that produces proceeds
known by the payee to be earmarked for use in illicit activity,
be a "real" defense under California Commercial Code section 3305(2) (b).
While noting that the defendant in First Western Bank &
Trust Co. v. Bookasta 4 was not, in the first instance, liable on
a promissory note made by a corporation on which his signature did not appear,5 the Court held that if the corporation
could be shown to be merely the "alter ego" of the defendant,
the plaintiff would be entitled to enforce the note against him
on that basis.s This decision opens the door to plaintiffs to
enforce negotiable instruments according to their terms
against individuals who use alter ego corporations for business
purposes.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1970/iss1/15

2. See Cal. Com. Code §§ 3305 and
3306.
3. Cal. Com. Code § 3305(2)(b).

5. Citing Cal. Com. Code § 3401(1):
"No person is liable on an instrument
unless his signature appears thereon."

4. 267 Cal. App.2d 910, 73 Cal.
Rptr. 657 (1968).

6. 267 Cal. App.2d 910, 914-916, 73
Cal. Rptr. 657, 659-660 (1968).
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C. Decisions Interpreting Division 9
In the period under consideration, the courts demonstrated
a familiarity and aptitude for working with the provisions of
Division 9 of the California Commercial Code. Judicial attention to explicit exclusions from the operation of the Division and to the definitions of terms set forth in the statute
produced decisions that are consistent with the statutory pattern. In Morris Plan Company of California v. Moody,7 the
Court resolved the issues before it by attending to California
Commercial Code section 9103 ( 4), which establishes that the
method of perfecting a security interest in motor vehicles is
governed exclusively by California Vehicle Code sections
6300 and 6301. In determining the applicability of Division
9 to security interests in promissory notes that were in turn
secured by deeds of trust on real property, the Court in Riebe
v. Budget Financial Corp.8 noted that while Division 9 does
not apply to liens on real estate,9 the Division does apply to
security interests in obligations that are, in turn, secured by
real estate liens.lo
A federal Court, applying California law, also easily disposed of a case before it by focusing on the precise wording of
section 9401 ( 1 ) (a) . That section establishes the office of the
County Recorder in the county of the debtor's residence as the
proper place for filing a financing statement to perfect a security interest in equipment used in farming operations. The
section, quite correctly, was held applicable to the issue of
whether a security interest had been perfected in harvesting
combines used by a "contract harvester" who owned no
farming property of his own. l l
7. 266 Cal. App.2d 28, 72 Cal. Rptr.
123 (1968).

9. See Cal. Com. Code § 9104(j).
10. See Cal. Com. Code § 9102(3).

8. 264 Cal. App.2d 576, 70 Cal.
Rptr. 654 (1968).

11. See Sequoia Machinery, Inc. v.
Jarrett, 410 F.2d 1116 (1969).
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III. Consumer Protection

A. In General
The Rees-Levering Automobile Sales Finance Ace 2 and the
Unruh Retail Installment Sales Ace 3 establish a statutory pattern for the regulation of virtually all consumer sales transactions involving goods or services in the State of California.14
During the period under investigation, legislative attention
to these statutes in the politically sensitive consumer protection area was intense. 15 While case law development regarding

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1970/iss1/15

12. Civ. Code §§ 2981-2984.3.
13. Civ. Code §§ 1801-1812.10.
14. The Rees-Levering Act, by its explicit terms, applies only to the sale of
motor vehicles, whereas the Unruh Act
controls consumer sales of all other
"goods," meaning tangible chattels, and,
with some exceptions, all services. (See
§§ 1802.1 and 1802.2.)
15. During the last three years, approximately 13 additions to or amendments of the Rees-Levering Act have
been passed by the California legislature. Some of the more significant
changes include the addition of section
2982.1, prohibiting "referral sales" selling practices in regard to motor vehicles;
the addition of section 2982.5, regulating, in some instances, certain aspects
of "secondary financing" for motor
vehicle purchases; the addition of section 2982.7, requiring the refund of
down payments made by buyers of motor vehicles in the event that the purchase contract is not executed; the
amendment of section 2983 to enable
the buyer to recover the fair market
value of his "tradein," or the value assigned to it in the motor vehicle purchase contract, whichever is greater, in
the event that the seller violates certain
disclosure provisions contained in section 2982.
During the years 1967 through 1969,
the Unruh Act has been the subject of
37 amendments, deletions, or additions.
456

Among the most significant are the following: the addition of section 1801.4,
which abrogates a portion of the decision in Morgan v. Reasor (see extended
discussion, infra); the deletion from section 1803.2 of the requirement that "referral selling" inducements made to the
buyer be set forth in the consumer sale
contract; the repeal of section 1803.9;
the addition of section 1803.10, prohibiting "referral sales" inducements in
the sale of consumer goods; the addition of section 1804.2, which is noted in
the discussion of Morgan v. Reasor, infra; the addition of section 1812, requiring that an affidavit for a writ of
attachment obtained in an action enforcing a consumer sale contract must
state facts showing that the suit has
been commenced in a proper court for
the trial of the action. (This amendment, effected by Statutes 1969, Ch. 669,
§ 1, is perhaps of lessened significance
in the light of the United States Supreme Court decision in Snaidach v.
Family Finance Corporation, 395 U.S.
337, 23 L.Ed.2d 349, 89 S.Ct. 1820
(1969), which held prejudgment wage
garnishments to be violative of procedural due process and the amendment to
section 1812.10, making the venue requirements for court enforcement of
consumer sale contracts jurisdictional.
The Office of the California Attorney
General issued an opinion in 1968 (51
Ops. Cal. Atty. Gen. 179) construing
CAL LAW 1970
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the Rees-Levering Act was minimal, judicial interpretation of
the Unruh Act produced the most significant California decision treated in this article.
B. The Rees-Levering Act

During the last two years, a series of five decisions relating
to the Rees-Levering Act appeared. The cases primarily
demonstrate application of the terms of the statute. The Court
in Hughes v. Nashua Manufacturing CO. 16 ruled that a "cutoff"
clause, by which an automobile purchaser waived any right to
assert claims he might have against the seller on the conditional sales contract against an assignee of the contract, was
ineffective because the assignee failed to give the buyer notice
of the assignment as required by section 2983.5. 17 Although
a portion of a conditional sales contract covering the sale of
a vehicle, and many other items, did not comply with section
2982, the Court in Ryan v. Mike-Ron Corporation 18 held that
the portion of the contract concerning the sale of the motor
vehicle was severable and that the seller could therefore enforce the remainder of the contract against the buyer.19 In
Zmack v. Arata Pontiac,20 the Court affirmed a trial court
decision of an automobile conditional sales contract on the
basis of three clear violations of the provisions of section 2982.
section 1812.10, as it then read, as imposing jurisdictional requirements. The
legislature in 1969 removed any question of interpretation on the point by
adding explicit language to the section.
Statutes 1969, Ch. 186, § 1.)
16. 257 Cal. App.2d 778, 65 Cal.
Rptr. 380 (1968).
17. Section 2983.5 provides that
written notice of the assignment must
be given to the buyer by the assignee.
The buyer then has a 15-day period after the mailing of the notice in which to
inform the assignee of any facts giving
rise to any claim or defense he may
have against the seller. The section
provides that if the notice is not given,
the buyer may assert any right of action
CAL LAW 1970
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that he has arising out of the contract
against an assignee of the contract, regardless of the existence of a contractual
cutoff clause.
18. 259 Cal. App.2d 91, 66 Cal. Rptr.
224 (1968).
19. If a motor vehicle's conditional
sales contract does not contain the
items specified in section 2982, the contract is rendered unenforceable against
the buyer. (See section 2983.) Thus,
if the buyer chooses, he may rescind
the contract. Of course, if the buyer
wishes to keep the motor vehicle, he
will be liable for the value of the vehicle to the seller.
20. 265 Cal. App.2d 689, 71 Cal.
Rptr. 506 (1968).
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An automobile lease under which the lessee was to pay rent in
a sum equivalent to the value of the automobile with a $1
purchase option at the end of the lease term was denoted a
conditional sales contract by the Court in Klein v. Leatherman. 1 A buyer who successfully cross complained against
his seller in an action by the assignee of an automobile conditional sales contract was awarded attorneys' fees as the "prevailing party" pursuant to section 2983.4 in Golden West
'Credit Corporation v. Maury.2
C. The Unruh Act and Morgan v. Reasor

Other than noting two minor decisions, 3 a discussion of
decisional developments under the Unruh Act must focus on
the California Supreme Court decision in Morgan v. Reasor
Corp.4 Because of its direct holdings, discussion of the realities of commercial and consumer financing, and statements
of judicial attitude and intendments, the decision in Morgan
is certain to become an oft-cited landmark.
On October 14, 1962, plaintiffs Morgan agreed to purchase
a house to be constructed by the predecessor in interest to
Reasor Corporation on a lot owned by plaintiffs. In connection with the agreement, the plaintiff buyers executed a contract entitled "Lien Contract and Deed of Trust." By the

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1970/iss1/15

1. 270 Cal. App.2d 792,76 Cal. Rptr.
190 (1969). The court partially relied
upon statutory language contained in
section 2981(a)(2).
2. 270 Cal. App.2d Supp. 913, 75
Cal. Rptr. 757 (1969). This decision
by the Los Angeles Superior Court Appellate Department relied heavily upon
Morgan v. Reasor Corp., infra.
3. People v. George, 257 Cal. App.
2d 805, 65 Cal. Rptr. 368 (1968), involved a conspiracy conviction of two
defendants who had engaged in activities prohibited by section 1812.6 of the
Unruh Act, which provides that persons
who wilfully violate the act shaH be
guilty of a misdemeanor. In James Talcott, Inc. v Gee, 266 Cal. App.2d 384,
458

72 Cal. Rptr. 168 (1968), the court rejected an argument that the Unruh Act
applied to the transaction before it. The
case involved the lease of a printing
press for use in the lessee's business.
The court pointed out that the Unruh
Act, which prohibits deficiency judgments, applies only to credit purchases
or leases of goods and services for personal, family, or household use. Thus,
the lessee businessman was held liable
for a deficiency judgment on the printing press lease.
4. 69 Cal.2d 881, 73 Cal. Rptr. 398,
447 P.2d 638 (1968). For further discussion of this case, see Bernhardt,
REAL PROPERTY, in this volume.
CAL LAW 1970
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terms of this contract, Reasor Corporation sold the labor,
management, and goods necessary to construct a particular
model of house on the buyers' property, and the buyers conveyed their real property, and subsequent improvements, to
a trustee, to be held as security until the buyers completed
payment for the house. At the same time, buyers executed a
note in favor of the seller, Reasor Corporation, for $19,398.12, $11,844 of which represented the cost of the house
with a "time price differential of $7,554.12."5 The note required the plaintiffs to make 71 monthly installments of
$116.06 each, with a final installment of $11,157.86.
Within three months, seller assigned the contract and note
to Midwest Homes Acceptance Corporation. Midwest took
the assignment with knowledge that the note and contract
arose simultaneously out of the same transaction and with
full knowledge of all the terms and conditions of the contract
and note.
As established by a settled statement of facts entered into
between the parties for purposes of appeal, the contract and
the promissory note were at no time encompassed in a single
document. The contract, at the time of execution by the
buyers, contained blank spaces that were later filled in without fraudulent intent by either seller or Midwest, and the note
was undated at the time it was executed by the buyers.6
The buyers brought up a threshold issue when they sued
seller and Midwest for, among other things, a declaration
that they had no liability for the obligation to pay the timeprice differential of $7,554.12, because the above mentioned
defects were violative of the Unruh Act. 7 The defendants
5. "Time-price differential" was defined in the Unruh Act at § 1802.10 as
being essentially equivalent to the meaning that a layman gives to the word
"interest."
The phrase was struck
from § 1802.10 by the 1969 legislature,
and the phrase "finance charge" was
inserted as a replacement. This change
was one of many made in the statute
by the legislature in order to make
the terminology of the Unruh Act conCAL LAW 1970
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form to that used in the federal Truthin-Lending Act. (See footnote on legislative developments, supra.)
6. The opinion of the Court of Appeal contains the settled statement that
establishes these facts. Morgan v. Reasor Corp., 67 Cal. Rptr. 577, 579-580
(1968). Final decision 69 C2d 881, 73
Cal. Rptr. 398, 447 P2d 638.
7. All three of the "defects" in the
transaction mentioned above are viola-
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argued that the Act was not applicable to the transaction, and
the alleged defects were therefore of no legal consequence.
The resolution of this threshold issue by the courts had been
anticipated by an opinion issued by the California Attorney
General in 1962.8 That opinion concluded that the labor and
materials furnished by a general contractor, pursuant to a
contract to construct a private residence, constituted "services" and "goods" as those terms were defined in the Act. 9
The trial court, Court of Appeal, and State Supreme Court all
reached the same conclusion.lO Although of academic intertive of provisions of the Unruh Act, if
that statute was applicable. If the note
and contract arose out of a transaction
involving "goods" and "services" as defined in sections 1802.1 and 1802.2, the
act would be applicable, and the requirements of sections 1803.1, 1803.2,
and 1803.4 would control. Thus, in
terms of the facts before the court, the
contract and note violated section
1803.2 because they were not contained
in one document, the note would violate
section 1803.1 because it was undated
at the time the buyers executed it, and
the blank spaces contained in the contract when it was signed by the buyers
would violate section 1803.4. If any
of the provisons of sections 1803.1,
1803.2, and 1803.4, or any other section in the Act, are violated in a retail
installment sale covered by the Act, the
time-price differential cannot be collected either by the seller, or by a person
acquiring the rights of the seller through
assignment or otherwise, who has
knowledge of the transaction's noncompliance with the Act. (Section 1812.7.)
Although unmentioned in the State
Supreme Court decision in Morgan, the
Court of Appeal's opinion contains reference to the fact that, by the terms of
the agreed statement that the parties
were using for the determination of the
appeal, the contract and note did not
provide for a service charge in excess
of that permitted by the terms of the
460
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Act. (See 67 Cal. Rptr. 577, 580.)
"Servke charge" as defined in section
1802.10 is synonymous with timeThe maximum
price differential.
amount of service charge that may be
included in a contract or note regulated
by the Act is two-thirds of one percent
per month on the unpaid balance, if
that balance is in excess of $1000.
(See section 1805.1.)
8. See 40 Cal. Ops. Atty. Gen. 232237.
9. Section 1802.2 of the Unruh Act
provides in part: .. 'services' means
work, labor and services, for other than
a commercial or business use, including
services furnished
in connection with the improvement of real property . . . ," and section 1802.1 provides in part: .. 'goods' means tangible
chattels bought for use primarily for
personal, family or household purposes
including goods which, at the
time of sale or subsequently are to be
so affixed to real property as to become
a part of the real property whether or
not severable therefrom
The Act applies to all "retail installment sales," which means: ". . . the
sale of goods or furnishing of services
by a retail seller to a retail buyer for a
time sale price payable in installments."
(Section 1802.5.)
10. See 67 Cal. Rptr. 577, 579 (trial
court result), 67 Cal. Rptr. 577, 581,
and 69 Cal.2d 881, 887-889, 73 Cal.
CAL LAW 1970
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est, the reasoning and result of the Court of Appeal and the
Supreme Court on this specific issue have been rendered moot
by the addition of section 1801.4 to the act by the legislature
in 1969. 11
Notwithstanding the fact that the specific kind of contract
involved in Morgan v. Reasor is exempted from coverage under the Unruh Act by section 1801.4, the effect of the Court's
reasoning with respect to the close connection rule will obviously apply to those contracts within the purview of the
Unruh Act. Therefore, an examination of the contracts involved in Morgan v. Reasor merits our attention. As previously indicated, when the Reasor contract was regarded
within the Unruh Act, the trial court ruled that Midwest was
entitled to recover the time-price differential provided in the
note and contract accruing after June 2, 1966. On that date,
Midwest, acting under court order, provided the buyers with
a completed copy of the contract. 12 Both the Court of Appeal
and the State Supreme Court disapproved this portion of the
trial court judgment on the ground that section 1812.7 provides that in the event the act is violated, the violator or a
knowledgeable successor in interest "is barred from recovery
"13
of any time price differential or service charge .
The buyers, as plaintiffs, were awarded attorneys' fees by
the lower court, pursuant to the court's reading of section
1811.1. 14 The Court of Appeal held the attorneys' fees award
Rptr. 398, 402-403, 447 P.2d 638, 642643 (1968).
11. See Statutes 1969, Ch. 554, section 1. The 1969 amendment provides
that the Unruh Act shaH not apply to
any contract for the construction, sale,
or construction and sale of an "entire
residence" or aH or part of a commercial or industrial building [see section
1801.4]. The second section to the
bill, which added section 180 1.4 to the
Act, reads: "This Act is intended to
abrogate any contrary rule in Morgan v.
Reasor Corp. 69 Cal.2d 881, 73 Cal.
Rptr. 398, 447 P.2d 638." (See Statutes 1969, Ch. 554, section 2.)
CAL LAW 1970
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12. See 69 Ca1.2d 881, 897, 73 Cal.
Rptr. 398,409, 447 P.2d 638, 649.
13. See 67 Cal. Rptr. 577, 583, 69
Cal.2d 881, 897,73 Cal. Rptr. 398, 409,
and 447 P.2d 638, 649.
14. Section 1811.1 of the Unruh Act
provides: "[R] easonable attorneys' fees
and costs shaH be awarded to the prevailing party in any action on a contract
or installment account subject to the
provisions of this chapter regardless of
whether such action is initiated by the
seller, holder or buyer."
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to be error, reasoning that because the action was essentially
one for declaratory relief to determine the applicability of the
Act to the contract and note, there was no action "on a contract" as required by section 1811.1.15 The State Supreme
Court affirmed this portion of the trial court judgment on the
basis that the phrase "on a contract" is to be liberally construed in accordance with expressed legislative intent. The
legislative purpose of section 1811.1, the Court noted, was
to encourage attorneys to accept cases from buyers who had
valid defenses and rights of action, but lacked private capital
to pay the necessary attorneys' fees. 16 Since an action for
declaratory relief is the only practical option available to a
buyer who owes a number of installments that include a timeprice differential factor and that are to fall due in the future,
the Court concluded that the legislature intended no limitation
on the type of action covered by section 1811.1, so long as
the subject matter of the litigation involved a contract to which
the Act applied. 17
The Court of Appeal decided to reverse the trial court decision so that the lower court could take evidence on the question of whether Midwest acquired the contract and note with
knowledge of their noncompliance with the Act. 1s The trial
court had failed to consider this issue, which is clearly critical,
since Midwest, as an assignee, would be barred by section
1812.7 from recovering the time-price differential only if it
had acquired the documents with knowledge that they violated
provisions of the Act. 19
The State Supreme Court held that the trial court decision
need not be reversed for the taking of evidence on the issue
15. 67 Cal. Rptr. 577, 583 (1968).
The Court announced its determination of the issue without the explicit
reasoning upon which it is based.
16. 69 Cal.2d 881, 896-897, 73 Cal.
Rptr. 398,408-409,447 P.2d 638, 648649. The Court quoted extensively
from Appendix to the Journal of the
Assembly (1959 Reg. Sess. Vol. 2, Report of the Subcommittee on Lending
and Fiscal Agencies, p. 23).
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17. 69 Cal.2d 881, 897,73 Cal. Rptr.
398, 409, 447 P.2d 638, 649. See also
Golden West Credit Corporation v.
Maury, 270 Cal. App.2d Supp. 913,
75 Cal. Rptr. 757 (1969), discussed
supra.
18. 67 Cal. Rptr. 577, 582-583.
19. See section 1812.7 of the Unruh
Act, cited and quoted supra.
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because Midwest, on the agreed facts of the case, had the requisite "knowledge"· required for the application of section
1812.7. 20
On the point of Midwest's status in regard to section 1812.7,
Justice Tobriner's opinion establishes a new criterion for the
future application of the section. Specifically, the decision
establishes that "constructive" knowledge is sufficient to constitute "knowledge" under section 1812.7. Thus, when Midwest acquired the note and contract as two separate documents from the seller, the fact that the documents were separate should have led it, according to the standard applicable
to a "reasonable man," to inquire as to whether the note and
contract had originally been contained in a single document.
A cursory inquiry, in the Court's view, would then have revealed to Midwest that the Unruh Act provisions requiring a
"single document" had been violated. 1
In adopting the theory of "constructive knowledge," the
Court rejected an analogy offered by Midwest to the law of
negotiable instruments, and sets forth an extremely significant
judicial attitude as well as giving a clear indication of judicial
intentions in the consumer financing field. This portion of the
opinion merits careful study and consideration by all members of the bar of this state.
The Court first states that the implementation of the Act,
with its avowed aim of protecting consumers from credit
abuses, requires that the standards for "knowledge," as that
word is used in section 1812.7, should not be established to
be so stringent as to permit easy avoidance of the section's
consequences by financiers who purchase the commercial
paper generated by retail installment sales to consumers. The
economic function of section 1812.7, and the consequences of
its application in the case of a seller inclined to frequently violate the Act, are then noted. Such a retailer will be forced to
sell his commercial paper at a greater discount than a merchant who steadfastly complies with the Act, since financing
20. 69 Cal.2d 881, 889-893, 73 Cal.
Rptr. 398, 403-406, 447 P.2d 638, 643646 (1968).
CAL LAW 1970
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1. 69 Cal.2d 881, 889, 73 Cal. Rptr.
398,403-404,447 P.2d 638, 643-644.
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agencies will feel reluctant to buy commercial paper that contains service charges that are unenforceable. This will, in
turn, cause the frequently violating retailer to charge a higher
price for his goods, and eventually customers will thereby be
deterred from dealing with him.2
Furthermore, the Court's liberal interpretation of the knowledge requirement of section 1812.7 will properly allocate the
financial loss arising from the unfair practices and credit
abuses prohibited by the Act. The impact of such violations
will, as a result of the Court's interpretation, be borne ".
not by a few consumers unable to pass on the loss or in any
way 'insure' against the effect of a harsh contract, but by the
finance companies that buy large numbers of notes."3 The
Court, in this regard, notes the obvious fact that consumer
sales financiers are obviously better able to bear the loss of an
occasional "bad deal" than are individual buyers.
In connection with this discussion of the "knowledge" issue,
the Court states:
Finally, strict enforcement [of the Act] will give finance
companies, with the knowledge and economic leverage
required effectively to police against Unruh Act violations, an incentive to do SO.4
Thus, the decision recognizes the great value in enlisting one
of the most powerful and sophisticated elements in the private
sector of the economy in the task of policing the marketplace
and preventing consumer abuse.
The Court recognized that its liberal interpretation of section 1812.7 will have some adverse effect on the negotiability
and free flow of commercial paper. However, the Court does
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2. 69 Cal.2d 881, 890, 73 Cal. Rptr.
398, 404, 447 P.2d 638, 644.
3. 69 Cal.2d 881, 890, 73 Cal. Rptr.
398, 404, 447 P.2d 638, 644. Perhaps
the Court's prediction in this regard is
overly optimistic, for one might well
have doubts as to the number of consumers who will have the necessary
knowledge and energy to enforce their
rights under the Unruh Act against
464

finance companies holding their notes.
In any event, the theory is quite sound,
and the author's reservation on this
point is based upon the lack of widespread and effective consumer education, a problem over which the court
obviously has no control.
4. 69 Cal.2d 881, 890, 73 Cal. Rptr.
398, 404, 447 P.2d 638, 644.
CAL LAW 1970

22

McCall: Commercial Transactions

Commercial Transactions

not deem this a serious problem and notes that the negotiability of consumer paper has previously been limited "without
apparent ill effect" by statutes in a number of states, including
California. 5 The decision tellingly indorses the thought on
this subject expressed by the Florida Supreme Court in Mutual
Finance Company v. Martin. 6 This decision declared that if
a limitation on negotiability in consumer paper worked an increased burden on the finance companies, it would merely be
a clear indication that the prior free negotiability of such
paper had previously worked a corresponding injustice on retail purchasers. 7
The Court notes that the rule announced in Popp v. Exchange Banks has been repealed for all intents and purposes
by the legislature through the enactment of the 1967 amendment to section 1804.2. Therefore, the Court rejected the
reasoning of that case as a valid analogy in construing the
word "knowledge" in section 1812.7. 9 In keeping with the
5. See 69 Cal.2d 881, 891, 73 Cal.
Rptr. 398, 404-405, 447 P.2d 638, 644645. Section 1804.2 of the Unruh Act,
as amended by Statutes 1967, Ch. 1294,
section 2, provides that an assignee of
the seller's rights in a retail installment
contract is subject to all claims and defenses that the buyer might have against
the seller arising out of the sale, notwithstanding the existence of a cutoff
clause in the sales contract. The assignee's liability in this regard is limited
to the amount of the debt owing to the
assignee at the time the defense is asserted. However, this limitation will not
affect a buyer's right to recoup service
charges previously collected by a seller
or his assignee on a contract that violates the Act, because section 1804.2
provides an exception for the operation
of section 1812.7. The subject of cutoff clauses, which are enforceable in
nonconsumer sales in California pursuant to Cal. Com. Code § 9206(1), is
mentioned in the decision of James Talcott, Inc. v. Gee, 266 Cal. App.2d 384,
387, 72 Cal. Rptr. 168, 170-171 (1968).
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6. 63 So.2d 649, 653, 44 A.L.R.2d 1
(Fla., 1953).
7. 69 Cal.2d 881, 891, 73 Cal. Rptr.
398, 404-405, 447 P.2d 638, 644-645
(1968).
8. 189 Cal. 296, 303; 208 P. 113
(1922). The rule, as stated by the
court, is that a holder in due course
does not bear a duty to investigate suspicious circumstances when he acquires
commercial paper. (69 Cal.2d 881,
891, 73 Cal. Rptr. 398, 404-405, 447
P.2d 638, 644-645.)
9. The basis of the Popp rule, to wit,
that a holder in due course of a negotiable instrument does not lose his preferred position when he acquires the
paper under suspicious circumstances if,
in fact, he had no subjective knowledge
of a defect in the transaction that produced the paper, is carried forward in
the definition of "holder in due course"
contained in Cal. Com. Code Section
3302(1). (See Cal. Com. Code Comment 2 to section 3302 and Cal. Com.
Code section 1201(19).) Thus, Popp
465
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indications contained in the portion of the decision concerning
the frequently violating seller, his financier, and section
1812.7, the Court concludes its discussion of the "knowledge"
issue with a statement that, in some situations, prior complaints against a seller might provide the "needed suspicious
circumstance" to charge the financier or purchaser of retail
installment sales contracts with "knowledge" of facts that he
would have learned if he had made inquiry.lo Thus, it is
quite clear that the California Supreme Court intends to impose liability for Unruh Act violations on financiers who continue to deal with retail sellers who have a history of noncompliance with the Act. All financial institutions are clearly
put on notice, direct and not constructive, of this significant
event in California commercial law.

D. Morgan v. Reasor and the Close Connection Rule
The portion of the Morgan v. Reasor decision discussed
above would establish the case as truly significant. However,
a later portion of the opinion, clearly obiter dictum, overshadows the foregoing in its significance and potential. The
Morgan decision will, in all likelihood, be principally remem-
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should still be considered good law in
nonconsumer paper situations. However, the Court's discussion of the history of the rule stated in Popp is quite
disparaging, at least in the context of
applying the rule by analogy to a point
of law in the consumer finance field.
(See footnote 16, 69 Cal.2d 881, 891892.) As noted in the body of this article, Popp has no validity in regard to
consumer commercial paper falling under the provisions of section 1804.2.
10. 69 Ca1.2d 881, 893, 73 Cal. Rptr.
398, 406, 447 P.2d 638, 646 (1968).
The Court also mentions that "an unusually high discount rate" might also
serve to give constructive notice of violations of the Unruh Act to the purchaser of consumer commercial paper.
Although the reference is ambiguous, it
may be that what the Court had in mind
466

on this point is the situation in which a
seller offers an extremely high discount
rate to a prospective purchaser of his
consumer commercial paper. However,
a retail seller's desire to obtain a purchaser of his commercial paper may be
merely a function of his need for initial
or added financing for new projects.
Thus, his willingness to offer a high
discount rate would be consistent with
situations other than a continuing effort
by the seller to violate the Unruh Act.
It seems, therefore, that a high discount
rate is an inappropriate fact, by itself,
to put a reasonable man-financier on
inquiry. Of course, a substantial number
of prior complaints against a seller
charging violations of the Act is clearly
an acceptable fact on which to base the
application of the "constructive knowledge" doctrine.
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bered because the Court chose this case as an opportunity to
offer a discussion concerning the problem of the third-party
financier who has a "close connection" with a sales transaction. The Court's statements regarding this subject deserve
the attention of all students of commercial law.
Other courts have recognized the artificiality involved when
distinguishing between a seller and his financier who buys
the seller's commercial paper, if the financier has entered into
a direct or close connection with the particular sales transaction that generates the commercial paper. Rather than give
the financier in such situations the status of a holder in due
course, who is free from defenses and rights of action that
the buyer would have against the seller, courts have occasionally treated the financier as a party to the original transaction rather than a third-party holder in due course. ll The
Court notes that the close connection rule, with the resultant
denial of holder-in-due-course status to the third-party financier, was applied by it in Commercial Credit Corp. v. Orange
County Machine Works, and states that the "gravamen" of the
Commercial Credit case or rule is that the seller extends credit
and accepts the buyer's note as, in essence, an agent for the
financier.lll In support of this reading of its prior decision, the
Court quotes a legislative committee report recommending
passage of the Unruh Act that discusses the evolution of installment sales financing, starting with the original situation
in which a businessman handled the entire credit sale transaction himself without contemplating the transfer of the buyer's
account receivable or promissory note to a third person. The
report goes on to note that in present-day consumer financing,
the seller generally has no intention of extending credit; but,
in accordance with previous arrangements, the account re11. Commercial Credit Corp. v.
Orange County Machine Works, 34 Cal.
2d 766, 214 P.2d 819 (1950); Commercial Credit Corp. v. Childs, 199 Ark.
1073, 137 S.W.2d 260, 128 A.L.R. 726
(1940); Unico v. Owen, 50 N.J. 101,
232 A.2d 405 (1967).
12. Certainly a casual, or even close,
reading of Commercial Credit would
CAL LAW 1970
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not disclose that the Court in that decision was consciously proceeding on
an agency theory. However, as the
Morgan v. Reasor decision notes, the
reading that it gives to Commercial
Credit has been "suggested by other
courts." 69 Cal.2d 881, 894, 78 Cal.
Rptr. 398, 406-407,447 P.2d 638, 646647 (1968).
467

25

Cal Law Trends
and Developments,
Vol. 1970, Iss. 1 [1970], Art. 15
Commercial
Transactions

.

ceivable or promissory note will be immediately sold to a
financier. Is
With the foregoing as an introduction, the Court chooses to
take this opportunity to specify the standards that it will henceforth require for the application of the close connection rule.
For that rule to apply, the buyer must show that the seller
contemplated that the credit for the transaction would be advanced, and that the note would be held by the particular
financier who did, in fact, eventually receive and hold the
buyer's note. This proof, since it amounts to a "demonstration of ratification of an undisclosed agency," is suffcient to
remove the shield of holder-in-due-course status from the
financier since, as a principal with an agent directly involved
in the sales transaction, the financier is on notice of all that
occurs in connection with the transaction. a The Court then
states that the agency theory, which it asserts was the basis
for the close connection rule applied in the Commercial Credit
decision, will apply to negate a financier's claims either to be
a holder in due course or to be ignorant of violations of the
Unruh Act in consumer sales situations.
The Court concludes this startling dictum by stating that
there is no adequate information in the fact situation before
it to determine what the seller contemplated in regard to the
eventual transfer of the buyers' note at the time of the sale. a
The decision then notes the following circumstances that might
give rise to an application of the close connection agency
principle: if there has been a "substantial number" of previ13. 69 Cal.2d 881, 895,78 Cal. Rptr.
398, 407-408, 447 P.2d 638, 647-648.
The court quotes from Appendix to the
Journal of the Assembly (1959 Reg.
Sess. Vol. 2, Report of the Assembly
Interim Committee on Finance and Insurance, p. 14). The term "financier"
as used in this article is generic and includes financial institutions as well as individuals.
14. 69 Ca1.2d 881, 895, 78 Cal. Rptr.
398, 407-408, 447 P.2d 638, 647-648.
15. 69 Cal.2d 881, 895, 78 Cal. Rptr.
398, 407-408, 447 P.2d 638, 647-648.
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However, in footnote 18 on page 893
of the opinion, the Court notes that the
fact that the paper was assigned to Midwest within a few weeks after its execution by the buyers, the fact that Midwest knew that the note and contract
were executed simultaneously and arose
out of the same transaction, and the
fact that the seller left blank spaces in
a contract for Midwest to complete, are
items that suggest a close connection
between the financier and seller in the
case before it.
CAL LAW 1970
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ous accounts receivable or promissory note purchases by a
given financier from a given seller;16 if the financier's name
appeared on the promissory note at the time it was executed
by a buyer; if the financier has inquired into the buyer's credit
rating;17 or if the commercial paper was assigned to the financier on the day it was executed by the buyer .1R
The sweep of the close connection rule as announced by the
Court will obviously include a vast percentage of all transactions in which a seller transfers notes and accounts generated by retail installment sales to his financier. Certainly, once
an arrangement has been entered into between a retailer and a
particular financier calling for the transfer by the retailer of
commercial paper generated by his sales, all future assignments or transfers of such paper between the retailer and financier will come under the close connection rule. Thus, the
"knowledge" requirement for the application of section
1812.7, will be satisfied in the vast majority of consumer sales.
It is also quite clear that since this portion of the opinion
deals with principles contained in the general law of commercial transactions and negotiable instruments, such as holderin-due-course status, the Court has effectively ended the
viability of that concept in the vast bulk of nonconsumer sales
financing transactions. 19
Another aspect of the decision that might well be pondered
by the commercial bar is the possible application of the
Morgan close connection rule in third-party financed commercial purchase transactions in which the buyer has signed
an agreement containing a "cutoff" clause. It would appear
that under the reasoning in Morgan, no true "assignment"
takes place when the seller transfers his rights to a "con tem16. The Court notes this would be a
factor that would "weigh heavily." (69
CaI.2d 881, 896, 78 Cal. Rptr. 398,
408, 447 P.2d 638, 648.)
17. Presumably, prior to the seller
entering into the sales contract.
18. 69 Cal.2d 881, 896, 78 Cal.
Rptr. 398, 408, 447 P.2d 638, 648
(1968).

19. In this connection, it should be
noted that the Commercial Credit Co.
case, on which the Court relies so heavily, involved the financing of a nonconsumer sale transaction. (See 34 Cal.2d
766, 767-768, 214 P.2d 818, 819-820
(1950).
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plated" third-party financier, because, in that situation, the
seller is merely the agent of the financier. Thus, the scope of
section 9206( I), and the validation of cutoff clauses contained
therein, may well be restricted to those assignments of contracts or accounts by commercial sellers to financiers who were
not contemplated as assignees by the seller at the time of the
sale. While section 9206 (1) is, pursuant to its terms, subject
only to statutes that negate cutoff clauses in consumer goods
purchases, the restrictive effect of the Morgan decision on the
section's scope predicted in this article does not contradict the
wording of the section or the intent of the legislature in passing
it. The section specifically makes cutoff clauses enforceable
by any assignee ". . . who takes his assignment for value,
in good faith and without notice of a claim or defense. . ."under the Morgan reasoning, the financier, as the principal,
has "notice" of claims or defenses to the same extent as his
"agent," the seller. Thus, the specific wording of the section
does not conflict with an application of the Morgan precedent
in situations involving cutoff clauses and commercial sales
transactions. Furthermore, the legislative history, which is
extensively noted in the California Code Comment, discloses
that the intention of the legislature in passing the section was
to overrule the decision in American National Bank of San
Francisco v. A. G. Sommerville, Inc.,20 which held cutoff
clauses to be invalid as a matter of law. The legislature did
not, as far as can be determined, consider the close connection
rule, as originally stated in Commercial Credit, as being affected by the passage of section 9206 ( 1 ) .1
One can argue with the statement in the Morgan decision
that the Court is merely specifying the standards and clarifying
the bases for the rule that it previously announced in the Commercial Credit in 1950. In Commercial Credit, the court went
to some pains to specify the application of the close connection
rule in terms specifically related to the facts before it. 2 The
20. 191 Cal. 364, 216 P. 376 (1923).
1. See Cal. Com. Code Comment 2
to section 9206.
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2. See 34 Cal.2d 766, 771, 214 P2d
819, 822 (1950), at which the Court
states the rule of the case as follows:
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focus of the Court's opinion in that case was a transaction in
which the financier "actively participated," and this feature of
the transaction was stressed in the Court's decision. It would
appear that "active participation" is a far different test for
the application of the close connection rule than that announced in Morgan v. Reasor, i.e., did the seller "contemplate"
that the note or account involved in the transaction would be
transferred to a particular financier? Furthermore, by making
it clear that the close connection rule, resting on an agency
theory, will apply in cases involving issues other than the alleged holder in due course status of a third-party financier,
the Court again goes well beyond its previous decision in Commercial Credit. Whether adequately based in precedent or
not, the close connection rule as enunciated in Morgan v. Reasor Corp. will, it is safe to say, be of lasting and major importance to commercial lawyers in the State of California.
"When a finance company actively
participates in a transaction of this type
from its inception, counseling and aiding the future vendor-payee, it cannot

be regarded as a holder in due course
of a note given in the transaction and
the defense of failure of consideration
may properly be maintained."

'"
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